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It’s the Geography, Stupid!
An Introduction to Geographical Information 
 Systems in Political Science
Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen
Abstract
Much research in political science examines either countries or individuals. How-
ever, technological advances in geographic information systems (GIS) software 
and the ubiquity of geo-coded data in recent years have opened up the possibil-
ity of political science research that is attentive to (1) spatial aspects of political 
phenomena and (2) potential biases resulting from the dominance of country- and 
 individual-based analysis in the discipline. In this article, I first present GIS and its 
possibilities for researchers (including existing, user-friendly GIS databases), and 
then show how GIS and spatial data have been used to examine the eﬀects of arti-
ficial borders in Africa on civil war and development. Finally, I will oﬀer my thoughts 
on how GIS can move forward political science in each of the traditional subfields of 
comparative politics, international relations and public administration.
1. Introduction
Modern political science has generally taken the sovereign state as well as indi-
viduals within one sovereign state as its natural units of analysis.¹ Does eco-
nomic development lead to democracy? To find out, study correlations between 
income per capita and levels of democracy in as many of the world’s countries 
as possible, preferentially over time. Does education lead to political tolerance? 
Study as many individuals as possible in a given country or across countries, 
and you will know. The field of international relations is basically founded on 
the premise that relations between sovereign states hold the only key to under-
standing patterns of peace and war.
Students of supranational organizations like the EU or scholars of postcolo-
nial societies have voiced concerns over this preoccupation, noting that policy 
authority is increasingly devolved upwards and downwards from the sover-
eign state (Hooghe & Marks 2003) or that many national governments out-
side Western Europe and North America do not project their power over their 
1  Notable early postwar exceptions are V.O. Key’s Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949) and Robert 
Dahl’s Who Governs (1961), while a later exception is Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993).
250 Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen
entire territories (Herbst 2000; Scott 2009). Likewise, recent research in politi-
cal behavior has drawn attention to the local contexts and social networks in 
which individuals are embedded and which shape their political attitudes and 
participation (Gerber et al. 2008; Bond et al. 2010). More broadly, students of 
subnational politics and political methodologists have questioned both meth-
odological individualism and methodological nationalism in urging conceptual 
attention to appropriate levels of analysis (Agnew 1996; Snyder 2001; Hilgers 
2011; Harbers & Ingram 2014). But how can we avoid the pitfall of abandoning 
the goal of analysis and generalization and contenting ourselves with proclaim-
ing immense complexity? I propose that one way to do so is to cultivate ‘spatial 
awareness’ – always trying to locate politics in space – and complement it with 
the tools furnished by Geographic Information Systems (or GIS).
By space, I mean geographic linkages between objects, units and actors 
of interest. The starting premise of linking data to space is that almost every 
type of information has a geographical referent. A country has borders exist-
ing in definite places, individuals move around in space, wars take place (also) 
in delimited spaces that troops, tanks or drones physically inhabit, and even 
rocket missiles have ranges that are limited in space. With regard to the chal-
lenges raised above, spatial awareness and GIS can help political scientists ana-
lyze subnational governments, peripheral territories that are only under partial 
central government control and the impact of local contexts and spatially proxi-
mate networks on individuals. As such, I will emphasize the potential for spa-
tial awareness and GIS to advance political science in terms of theory-testing 
and to some extent also theory-building.
In this article I will first present GIS and its possibilities for researchers, 
including existing user-friendly GIS databases that allow for spatial representa-
tion of data without the need for technical savvy. Secondly, I will use the exam-
ple of the Scramble for Africa and the artificial borders drawn at the Berlin 
Conference in 1885 to show how studies utilizing GIS have investigated large, 
otherwise intractable problems in social science. I will also use this example 
throughout the paper to illustrate the challenges and opportunities for research 
that spatial awareness grants us. I then oﬀer my thoughts on how GIS can move 
forward the traditional political science subfields of comparative politics, inter-
national relations and public administration. Finally, I conclude that geography 
in political science is not only about using GIS to test existing theories, and that 
spatial awareness may also help our theory-building by making us more aware 
of geographical linkages in politics.
2. Everything is Spatial: GIS in Practice
Why should you care about Geographic Information Systems (GIS)? At the most 
basic level, what the technological advances in software and spatial data make 
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possible is the combination of otherwise incongruous types of data. This is rel-
evant not only to the quantitative study of political phenomena: historians have 
been at the forefront of applying GIS methods to their work, constructing maps 
and visual representations to track networks, interactions and ways of seeing 
the world of elite actors, migrants, and social movements (Hillier & Knowles 
2008; Gordon 2008; Dear et al. 2011; Bol 2013).
Simply visualizing data in the form of maps and examining spatial patterns 
(and their dynamics and changes over time) in my own experience yields a 
greater understanding of any topic and allows for a quick and intuitive over-
view of many types of data. As Gary King put it, “Displaying data geographi-
cally helps because it connects a variable we wish to explain with numerous 
others coded on the same level of geography. Moreover, because most observ-
ers know the values of many of these variables without having to look them 
up, geographical displays are instantly recognizable and interpretable.” (1996: 
161). While specific GIS software – most prominently ArcGIS – is essential for 
conducting independent and substantial research using spatial data, there 
exists a wealth of resources freely available, which allow for more informal 
spatial reasoning. The Center for Geographical Analysis at Harvard University 
has developed the open-source WorldMap platform in order to “lower barriers 
for scholars who wish to explore, visualize, edit, collaborate with, and publish 
geospatial information.”
Table 1. Selected digital, interactive maps from WorldMap 
AfricaMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/africamap/
ChinaMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/chinamap/
Map of the Russian Empire: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/russianempire
ChicagoMap: http://worldmap.harvard.edu/chicago/
Each of the digital maps in Table 1 contains spatially referenced information 
for diﬀerent historical periods – such as the distribution of ethnic groups, lan-
guages, locations of armed conflict, slave ports (including the number of slaves 
exported), individual slave trade expeditions (including number of slaves, des-
tination port, nationality of traders, year and date and more), and emitted light 
as recorded by satellite imagery (a strong proxy for income in Africa, see Hen-
derson 2012) for the AfricaMap. The maps are easily constructed using point-
and-click to show various layers of information alongside each other. Below, I 
will use the AfricaMap to illustrate the diﬀerent forms that data can take in GIS 
because of the simplicity and richness of this particular map.
What GIS can help us do is to categorize the political objects that we deem to 
be of importance into types of spatial data that we can then relate to each other 
thanks to their common spatial referent of GPS coordinates. The four basic 
types of spatial data are (1) points (for instance landmarks such as churches, 
λ͘ Points: a GPS coordinate (city, building, site of battle, etc.)
μ͘ Lines: the sum of points directly between two GPS coordinates (river, road, gas pipeline, etc.)
ν͘ Polygons: the area enclosed by lines that connect each other (administra-tive units, lakes, etc.)
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the location of a battle or residence of an individual that we know something 
about from a survey or registry), (2) lines (such as infrastructure networks like 
roads, railroads or gas pipelines), (3) polygons (i.e. connected lines that enclose 
an area such as administrative units or countries) and (4) what are known as 
‘rasters’ (meaning continuously varying information that is available for each 
point in a large area at a certain resolution, i.e. topography, emission of night-
time lights, etc.).²
These datasets are each geocoded (using GPS coordinates) and packaged 
in ‘shapefiles’ that can be accessed in GIS software. Such shapefiles of vari-
ous types of data are available online from various administrative agencies, 
international organizations and other scholars (for a partial overview, see the 
Wikipedia page “List of GIS data sources”.)
Table 2. Types of spatial data
Points: a GPS coordinate (city, building, site of battle, etc.)
Lines: the sum of points directly between two GPS coordinates (river, road, gas pipeline, etc.)
Polygons: the area enclosed by lines that connect each other (administrative units, lakes, etc.)
Rasters: information available for each point in a given area at a certain granularity (light 
density, topography, temperature, etc.).
Figure 1 shows the AfricaMap with three data sources overlaid on a simple ter-
rain from Google: points, i.e. green bubbles that represent slave ports scaled in 
size by how many slaves were exported from them (Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
Database 2010), blue lines showing major rivers (Natural Earth Project 2013), 
and colored polygons showing religious composition across first-level admin-
istrative units in African countries in 2005 (World Religion Database 2008). For 
the latter, darker green areas have a higher percentage of Muslims, darker blue 
more Christians and darker red more tribalists. The slave trade data have been 
used in a number of studies to examine the eﬀects of the slave trade on pre-
sent-day economic development and social characteristics such as trust (Nunn 
2008; Nunn & Wantchekon 2011), distance to major rivers could provide a rel-
evant control variable in many diﬀerent types of studies, and research using GIS 
has also tried to explain why certain parts of Africa are predominantly Mus-
lim, while in others Protestant and Catholic missionaries succeeded in spread-
ing the gospel (Michalopoulos et al. 2012; Nunn 2010). Figure 2 shows instead 
the Landscan raster dataset which uses census data and satellite images of 
light density at night (detecting light from human settlements) to obtain fine-
grained and precise information on population density across Africa (Landscan 
2  Using GIS in 3D adds a third dimension to X-Y coordinates, which will not be covered here (see for 
instance Dell 2010). Geometrical GIS objects (points, lines and polygons) are sometimes called vec-
tors and contrasted to the pixel-based raster data.
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2010). As such, darker areas on the map are more densely populated. In section 
3.1, I will review research of the eﬀect of ethnic partition by country bounda-
ries in Africa using some of these data.
Figure 1 and 2. AfricaMap with polygons (country borders and World religion data-
base), points (slave ports) and lines (major rivers) and AfricaMap with polygons 
(country borders) and raster (population density)
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Geocoding data of these four types (i.e. adding spatial information to them) 
then allows the computation of relations between them. This usually means 
joining information from other ‘layers’ than the one representing the unit of 
analysis with which one is concerned.
If the unit of analysis is polygons such as administrative units, then points 
(measuring the number of battles in a civil war for instance) may be counted 
within the territory of a given polygon, a variable may be constructed coding 
for whether or not a line (such as a road or river) traverses the polygon, and 
the average of a raster (such as topography or altitude) may be calculated for all 
polygons. We may also calculate which other polygons overlap with the admin-
istrative unit we are interested in, such as parliamentary constituencies. If the 
unit of analysis is points, like surveyed individuals based on residence, then the 
soil type (polygon) in the place in which the individual lives may be joined to 
the individual, as goes for the distance from the individual to a country border 
(line of a polygon) or highway (line), or the average density of light emitted at 
nighttime in a 25 kilometer radius from the individual (raster). Joining infor-
mation from other points to a point can be done in a number of ways: the dis-
tance from the individual’s residence to the closest school, for instance, or the 
number of schools in a certain radius from the surveyed individual. Likewise, 
lines or ‘rasters’ may be related to other data of their own type or the three 
other forms of data.
These are the fundamental building blocks of GIS and spatial analysis. 
Knowing these types of data allows one to make sense of the vast majority of 
studies in social science utilizing GIS, including the ones presented above, and 
the example I turn to in the following section.
3. Geography in Political Science: Then and Now
The focus of political science on individuals and countries, to the exclusion 
of geography and space, is a postwar phenomenon. The founders of academic 
American political science at Johns Hopkins University in the late 19th century 
were schooled in ‘Old Institutionalism’ focused on the geographical transmis-
sion of ideas and institutions, which produced for instance the well-known 
Turner Thesis (Turner 1893) of the American frontier (see Ethington & McDan-
iel 2007: 135–7). With the behavioral revolution and the systematic collection of 
survey data and national-level data, however, geography slid out of the political 
science mainstream. While engaging and theoretically fruitful, these works of 
‘old institutionalism’ and other literatures such as comparative historical soci-
ology ultimately were weaker in conclusively and systematically establishing 
their findings and eliminating alternative hypotheses than most of the quan-
titative work that became possible (see for instance critiques of comparative 
historical sociology by Geddes [1990] and King et al. [1994]). Yet today, newer 
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studies utilizing the GIS tools enumerated above can help social science provide 
systematic and triangulating tests of the accounts of the vital questions asked 
by ‘old institutionalism’ and comparative historical sociology and geography in 
politics, more broadly.
I will now show how – using GIS and these four types of geocoded data – 
new research has tested the eﬀect of African borders on the wellbeing of the 
continent’s citizens, as the borders have been argued to be artificial and poor 
for stability and development. I will take care to highlight the role played by 
spatial data in answering this otherwise diﬃcult research question.
3.1 THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA AND ARTIFICIAL BORDERS
In addition to colonial rule (Acemoglu et al. 2001) and the slave trade (Nunn 
2008), one of the causes of Africa’s poverty and proneness to war, civil war and 
violence highlighted by Africanist historians is the imposition of unsuitable 
borders by European powers (Thomson 2010). Beginning at the Berlin Confer-
ence in 1884–5, arbitrary borders were drawn, and many have proven remark-
ably persistent up until today. Historians have argued that this has hindered the 
development of cohesive nation-states and led to ethnic strife (Horowitz 1985): 
if an ethnic group is partitioned, then its members may agitate for reunion with 
their ethnic brethren across the border, and in a conflict its members may be 
able to retreat and regroup on the other side of the national border, which may 
make them more of a threat to other ethnic groups or the national government. 
However, historians and political scientists have not been able systematically 
and conclusively to establish this finding. In an age of secessionism and of the 
emergence of new states such as South Sudan, the eﬀects of the location of 
borders are therefore a question of very high substantive academic and policy 
interest.
In order to study the eﬀects of ethnic partition and implicitly the eﬀect of 
this particular pernicious European influence on Africa, Stelios Michalopoulos 
and Elias Papaoiannou (forthcoming) examine conflict in the areas traditionally 
inhabited by split ethnic groups, the involvement of partitioned ethnic groups 
in ethnic conflict as well as the living standards and educational attainment of 
individuals belonging to partitioned ethnic groups. To do this, they combine 
a large number of data sources using the GIS toolbox described in section 2.
In order, first, to find out which ethnic groups were partitioned and which 
were not, they first use spatial data on the locations and borders of mid-19th 
century ‘homelands’ of ethnic groups collected by ethnographers and mis-
sionaries [polygons] and present-day country borders [polygons] to determine 
that 229 of these ethnic homelands are partitioned by one or more present-day 
country borders, while 596 are not (see figure 3). They are also able to show 
that ethnic and precolonial characteristics pertaining to the ethnic groups in 
question (such as precolonial kingdoms, major cities, sites of major battles, 
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family structure, etc.) do not predict whether an ethnic homeland is split by a 
border or not. This makes sense insofar as European border-drawers were mak-
ing these decisions without local knowledge, far away from the African areas 
concerned. The only things that predict split are the size of an ethnic homeland 
and the presence of major lakes in the territory of an ethnic homeland.
Figure 3. Partitioned and non-partitioned ethnic homelands (from Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, forthcoming)
However, because Michalopoulos & Papaoiannou want to conduct within-coun-
try comparison, they use as their unit of analysis not the ethnic homelands, 
but rather the ‘country-ethnic area’ (i.e. the part of a given ethnic homeland in 
a given country). Of these there are 1212 in 49 countries [polygon]. Using spa-
tially disaggregated data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED) on violent events from 1997 to 2013, measured at the specific location 
of the violent event [point], Michalopoulos & Papaioannou can assign these to 
the country-ethnic area in which they take place. As such, they show that ethni-
cally partitioned country-ethnic areas experience more battles between armed 
actors (state or non-state) and one-sided violence against civilians than other 
country-ethnic areas in the same country – also when examining only country-
ethnic areas close to borders. The diﬀerences are strikingly large: the prevalence 
of conflicts with one or more deaths is estimated to be between 40 and 60 per-
cent higher in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities (2015: 18). Equally, there 
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is a (generally smaller) spill-over eﬀect to country-ethnic areas adjacent to split 
ethnicities. Michalopoulos & Papaioannou also use data from the ACLED on the 
conflict actors to show that government forces, rebels and militias and especially 
external government forces are more likely to engage in violence in partitioned 
country-ethnic areas. This backs up qualitative research indicating that foreign 
governments are especially likely to invade areas with large populations belong-
ing to an ethnic group on the other side of the country border. Michalopoulos 
& Papaioannou also link the split ethnic groups to the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009) to show that groups that are partitioned by 
country borders are more likely to be victims of government discrimination and 
implicated in ethnically based civil wars.
Finally, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou examine individual outcomes using 
household data [points] from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) con-
taining location of residence and reported ethnicity. Matching this data to the 
split groups allows them to show that individuals identifying with partitioned 
ethnic groups have lower living standards, less access to public goods such as 
running water and electricity, and lower levels of education. Because they know 
where these respondents live, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou can also show 
that this is the case both for those living inside split homelands and for those 
outside them. Crucially, no matter where members of partitioned groups live, 
they appear to be disadvantaged, while members of non-partitioned groups 
who live in partitioned country-ethnic areas are not disadvantaged by it. In this 
way, their findings partly challenge Africanists who suggest that ethnic parti-
tioning is responsible for poverty in general in Africa: country-ethnic areas of 
partitioned groups do not have lower income per capita measured by emitted 
night lights recorded by satellite imagery [raster].
As such, it seems that traditional Africanist historiography overwhelm-
ingly had it right in emphasizing borders splitting ethnic groups in explain-
ing civil wars and violence episodes in Africa, and further that the economic 
eﬀects of this European heritage appears present only for citizens who belong 
to partitioned groups. In beginning to answer this question, Michalopoulos 
& Papaioannou have also provided us with a creative, new research design 
that will likely lead to more research that will enable us to understand ethnic 
partitioning, conflict and African history even better. But many possibilities 
remain to test even the same question by leveraging spatial thinking and data: 
Michalopoulos & Papaioannou look at contemporary borders, but do not in fact 
trace the development of African borders from 1885 until today (see also sec-
tion 4.1 for the problems this poses for the results in the paper). Which ones 
changed, and which did not? Were early borders that partitioned groups more 
likely to change later than those which did not? While answers to these ques-
tions are unlikely substantially to change the findings in this research project, 
there is still much we do not know.
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4. Advancing Political Science: Spatial Awareness 
and GIS
After outlining the concrete tools of GIS and showing an example of its inno-
vative use to address one of political science’s great questions, here I oﬀer my 
thoughts on how spatial awareness and GIS can further political science as a 
discipline. I then give a number of specific examples of questions and topics 
in each of the three traditional subfields of comparative politics, international 
relations and public administration that I believe spatial thinking and GIS 
could help address.
4.1 THEORY TESTING, DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGNS
Political scientists’ preoccupation with the sovereign state and atomic indivi-
duals not only increases the risk that we miss out on interesting political phe-
nomena in between them, but also may carry implications for the validity of 
the results we find. By allowing for new tests of existing theories GIS can help 
improve the quality of our analysis and inference and thus hold the potential 
for political science to progress.
Firstly, it can do this by allowing the integration of data sources. As 
emphasized in section two of this article, space is a common denominator 
of almost all types of data and thus allows for integrating otherwise incon-
gruent datasets by common spatial referents. If the units of analysis of dif-
ferent datasets are not compatible, they can often be made so by the addition 
of geocodes. In the example of the Scramble for Africa, the existing, non-
geocoded Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009) was linked 
with the dataset of partitioned ethnicities constructed by Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou using GIS. Furthermore, many of the new data sources referred 
to as ‘Big Data’ are recorded with spatial information such that for instance 
google searches and some social network activity may be linked to a specific 
place (see Stephens-Davidowitz [2013] and Jamal et al. [2015]). Historical 
sources – such as information at the city-level, census records or historical 
borders – are often also possible to geocode at relatively low cost or eﬀort. 
In this way, more data may be brought to bear on our theories to adjudicate 
between competing theories.
Secondly, GIS and spatial thinking can help political science advance by mak-
ing possible new research designs to test our theories. Conducting subnational 
analysis is much more straightforward with GIS, and complementing or mov-
ing beyond the cross-country and cross-country time-series research design can 
help improve the validity of our causal inference on macro-political phenomena 
for a number of reasons: Countries are inherently very diﬃcult to compare in a 
manner that is suﬃciently attentive to their particularities. Comparing subna-
tional political units holds a great many potentially unobserved factors constant 
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across the units of analysis, lessening the risk of omitted variable bias (Snyder 
2001; Pande & Udry 2005). By using geocoded datasets or geocoding existing 
datasets ourselves, we add spatial information that can be used for new research 
designs both within and between countries (such as natural experiments based 
on geographical discontinuities or precise instrumental variables, etc.). Again 
using the example of the Scramble for Africa, Michalopoulos & Papaoiannou 
create a new unit of analysis for their study by combining two shapefiles con-
taining polygon data: the country-ethnic area, i.e. the part of an ethnic home-
land contained in a given country. This then allows them to compare areas 
within the same country that were historically inhabited by a split and a non-
split group, something that would have otherwise been impossible.
Such new research designs enabled by GIS can help to ameliorate the 
threats to inference originating from what geographers call the ‘Modifiable 
Areal Unit Problem’ (or MAUP): the challenge posed by the aggregation of local 
data into higher-order units for statistical analysis (Openshaw 1983). The basic 
intuition of the problem is that summary values for a given variable of higher-
order units are highly influenced by the specific choice of boundaries if there 
is local variation in the variable. This holds because the areal units (coun-
tries, provinces, municipalities) are modifiable; political scientists who work 
on the subject of gerrymandering in political districts are acutely aware of 
this phenomenon. As Alesina & Spolaore put it, in social science “[…] borders 
themselves are treated as part of the geographical landscape, like coasts or 
mountains. However, national borders are not a natural phenomenon; they 
are human-made institutions […]” (2005: 2). This introduces yet another disad-
vantage of country-level analysis: for any factor that has substantial, territorial 
within-country variation, MAUP potentially biases results – and when coun-
tries split up or amalgamate, MAUP is also one of the reasons that this may 
change our findings. Thus, MAUP may confound any potential causal relation-
ship analyzed across sovereign states if the causal processes that produce the 
specific number of sovereign states and the territorial extent of these states at 
a given time are also correlated with the independent or dependent variable. 
What this means, essentially, is that conclusions about causal relationships 
reached by comparing countries may be misleading or outright wrong when-
ever we study variables that are plausibly also related to breakdown, amal-
gamation or emergence of sovereign states – most obviously colonialization, 
state capacity, federalism, secessionist sentiment, etc. at the domestic level 
and peace, war, free trade regimes, etc. at the international level.³ Even in the 
3  Studying the processes of state formation and recognition, both eminently territorial, in history 
and today can help us determine which variables to worry about in relation this type of confoun-
ding. An example is Coggins’s book-length study of which secessionist movements are elevated to 
the status of states and admitted into the international community of states after World War II, 
finding that support from great powers in the international system is crucial (Coggins 2014).
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(primarily subnational) study by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, MAUP could 
pose a problem: if ethnic partitioning (their independent variable) or civil war 
(one of their dependent variables) mattered for how many sovereign states 
emerged in Africa and where their borders came to lie, then their results may 
be biased. This would in fact appear very likely. South Sudan and Eritrea are 
Africa’s two newest states which both came into being following particularly 
vicious civil wars with ethnic components. If borders have been moved to less 
conflict-prone areas and towards aligning with ethnic boundaries since 1884, 
then the partitioned ethnicities analyzed by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 
given current boundaries may experience less conflict than would have been 
case without endogenous border displacement, and their estimate of the eﬀect 
of ethnic partitioning on conflict may be biased downwards (i.e. smaller than 
the true causal estimate).
In addition to helping us solve these problems with much existing (pri-
marily cross-country) research by facilitating subnational analysis, natural 
experiments and geographical regression discontinuity designs, using GIS 
software with certain types of geocoded data also allows us to perform cross-
country analysis holding political units constant over time, instead of allowing 
them to change endogenously. As such, GIS would also allow Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou to run their analyses on ethnic partitioning using only the bor-
ders that have not changed since 1885, since 1914, and since 1960, and to see 
whether their results are the same. For many types of research, GIS can even 
help us construct ‘virtual countries’ to use as complementary units of anal-
ysis, i.e. dividing the world into a number of squares, calculating values for 
relevant variables for them and performing analyses at this level of analysis 
(Michalopoulos 2012; Abramson 2014; Alesina et al. forthcoming).
However, GIS obviously cannot solve every problem of causal inference. 
Furthermore, certain types of GIS-assisted analysis contain risks of their own: 
in subnational analysis, for instance, processes of diﬀusion between subna-
tional political units with relatively permeable borders make the assumption of 
the independence of causal processes taking place internally in units without 
outside influence even less tenable than in cross-national studies (see Imke & 
Harbers 2014 for ways to address this problem statistically). Additionally, it is 
not always warranted to conduct analysis at the lowest possible level of aggre-
gation (such as the municipality) if the phenomenon studied is intimately tied 
to, or takes place at, a higher level of aggregation (such as at the provincial level 
or in the capital city). The spatial projection of power and linkages between 
diﬀerent places can also be diﬃcult to analyze using GIS. Edward Gibson dis-
tinguishes between the site (territorial arena) and scale (territorial reach) of 
political action because “goals pursued in one geographic location are often 
means toward objectives in other locations.” (2013: 16). When site and scale 
are the same location, meaning that political action is directed at an outcome 
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in the same location as that in which the political action takes place, a variable 
or causal relationship is easily ‘geo-operationalized’, i.e. tied to a single geo-
graphical referent. But when this is not the case, ‘geo-operationalizing’ a vari-
able or a causal relationship requires more reflection, and in these cases they 
often should not be solely reduced to a single geographical referent. In the case 
of ethnic partitioning and conflict, for instance, much relevant conflict caused 
by this division could take place outside the historical homelands of the ethnic 
group in question, for instance if separatists motivated by grievances related to 
the partitioning of their ethnic group undertake terrorist attacks in the capital 
city [site] to pressure influential national policymakers to change policy in the 
area where the partitioned group lives [scale].⁴
Despite these limitations, the new research designs made possible by GIS 
thus allow us to test political science theories in a way that is less vulnerable 
to omitted variable bias and MAUP biases rooted in how our units of analysis 
come about. This in turn should make political science more accurate in its 
explanations.
4.2 GIS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The example of Michalopoulos & Papaoiannoy’s work on the Scramble for 
Africa is easily translated to much of comparative politics at the micro- and 
macro-levels. Just to give a few examples, in comparative politics geographi-
cally informed studies of party systems, ethnic relations, public goods provi-
sion, multilevel governance, and election fraud all present great potential and 
are beginning to be published (for recent examples, see Ichino & Nathan 2013 
and Dinesen & Sønderskov 2015).
In the field of international relations, questions such as the relationship of 
supra-national organizations to sub-national regions desiring autonomy, the 
use of strategic maps by diplomats and policy-makers, of national minorities 
in border regions and the risk of war and many others are equally amenable 
to the use of GIS. Here as well, disciplinary trends such as the publication, by 
the Journal of Conflict Resolution in December 2014, of a special issue entitled 
“Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and Political Violence: 
Issues, Challenges, and the Way Forward” using GIS, indicate that a ‘spatial 
turn’ is taking place.
In contrast, the research so far done in the sub-discipline of public admin-
istration has perhaps been touched the least by the possibilities unleashed 
by GIS. This near-absence of research in public administration using GIS is 
4  Including this type of conflict is another advantage to Michalopoulos & Papaioannou of linking their 
data to the EPR dataset, which records ethnic conflict involving a given group no matter where it 
takes place (2015: 29).
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somewhat paradoxical: in real-life administration at municipal, provincial and 
national levels GIS tools are ubiquitous and used in planning to determine the 
locations of new schools, hospitals, roads and other types of infrastructure. 
Equally, they are used to manage existing infrastructure and improve local pub-
lic service provision.⁵ Furthermore, a large literature in public administration 
is concerned with analyzing governance and policy networks of bureaucrats 
and agencies (O’Toole 1997; 2014), which are highly conditioned by geographi-
cal distance. Taken together, this implies that there is a large potential for such 
studies, that quite possibly there is ‘low-hanging fruit’ to be picked in the field 
of public administration, and that scholars could benefit from embracing a spa-
tial mindset and the tools of GIS.
5. Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that all political actors and political action are 
ultimately grounded in geographical space. For this reason, political science 
can progress further if we as its practitioners adopt a spatial mindset and avail 
ourselves of the possibilities inherent in geographic information systems for 
testing existing theories in new ways. While comparative politics and interna-
tional relations are beginning to incorporate space in their analyses, its poten-
tial is, however, still underexplored and research public administration is nota-
bly lagging behind. Therefore, I have highlighted an example of geographically 
informed research that I believe advances political science and given examples 
of where we still have work to do on which GIS can be of assistance.
In furthering political science, I have laid my emphasis on the possibilities 
furnished by GIS to test existing theories through new data and new research 
designs. However, I believe spatial awareness may also help us as political sci-
entists in theory-building: firstly, in theoretically incorporating political phe-
nomena that our focus on countries and individuals have concealed, and sec-
ondly in theoretically integrating hierarchical linkages between actors at local, 
intermediate, national and international levels as well as horizontal linkages 
between actors at the same levels. This would make our theories more complete 
and likely also more accurate.
Applying this methodology to the example of the Scramble for Africa for the 
last time, thinking about a number of questions may make our theory of the 
long-run eﬀects of European-imposed borders more complete: local conflict 
and inequality are likely shaped by subnational political contexts, so how do 
subnational civil servants and political oﬃcials (elected or appointed) seek to 
5  See for instance ”The Mayor’s Geek Squad”, The New York Times, March 23rd 2013, on the use of 
GIS data in New York City’s Oﬃce of Policy and Strategic Planning under previous mayor Michael 
Bloomberg.
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prevent or, conversely, to stoke the flames of conflict? How does local govern-
ment mitigate or exacerbate ethnic inequality? And what interests do national 
governments have in shaping these local governance outcomes? Another ques-
tion concerns the drawing of subnational boundaries. Do these follow eth-
nic boundaries, and when they do, does this make conflictual outcomes in 
partitioned ethnicities more or less likely? In Ethiopia since 1994, the intro-
duction of ethno-federalism meant the redrawing of subnational first-level 
administrative boundaries in accordance with the locations of large ethnic 
groups (including the Eastern-most Somali regional state), providing subna-
tional political leaders with institutional resources that may in part be used in 
conflicts. This happened after a destructive civil war, but from 1998–2003 and 
again from 2006–2009, Ethiopian-Somali conflict raged both within and out-
side Ethiopian territory (Kefale 2013).
Although the Ethiopian boundaries are likely more ‘natural’ in having been 
negotiated gradually between the indigenous Abyssinian kingdom and various 
European powers, thinking spatially about political action in between the indi-
vidual and the national level and linkages between national and local political 
oﬃcials, as well as between local political oﬃcials and individual citizens, may 
help us to locate some of causal mechanisms that connect ethnic partitioning 
and conflict.
Contemporary politics are inextricably linked with space and geography, 
as has been explored by historians, area specialists and qualitative scholars 
directly and indirectly since the infancy of political science. Yet, the possibili-
ties unlocked by GIS allow quantitative scholars to enrich such detailed, narra-
tive research with systematic testing and let qualitative scholars add yet another 
source of information to their in-depth accounts of complex political phenom-
ena. In addition to empirical and theoretical advances, an increased apprecia-
tion of geography may then also further better integration between quantitative 
and qualitative research in political science.
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